The Directive That Drove the Request
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's April 30, 2025, Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform memo set a specific 2027 deadline: "Achieve electromagnetic and air-littoral dominance by 2027." That directive, issued alongside mandates to field long-range missiles and enable AI-driven command and control at theater, corps, and division levels, created an accountability clock across Army program offices.
The Army entered FY2027 planning with a candidly assessed gap. A January 2026 memo from then-commander of Transformation and Training Command (T2COM), Gen. David Hodne — who retired in April 2026 — described the problem: the Army "lacks the ability to sense, locate, attack, and protect" in and through the electromagnetic spectrum, Defense News reported. The Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Characteristics of Need (EMSO CON), released alongside the Army's February 2026 request for information, put the full gap statement in operational terms: the Army "lacks the ability to sense, locate, attack, and protect in and through the EMS across competition and geographic continuums in order to generate necessary effects against targets of interest at range," and noted that EMSO fragmentation "prevents the Army from truly leveraging Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) for quick decision making."
The CoN became the organizing document for the FY2027 request. Chris Manning, capability program executive for intelligence and spectrum warfare, told reporters in August 2026 that the EMSO CON "is approved and we're operating off of [it] right now," and that it reflects a different approach to requirements: "defining the problem space instead of providing a prescriptive technical spec." Inside Defense, Sep 11, 2026
What the Budget Prioritizes
The FY2027 request reflects that problem-space framing. The Army asked for $444 million total for EW and SIGINT across RDT&E and procurement, up from the FY2026 request by an undisclosed amount — Breaking Defense noted the EW topline increased over last year's request without disclosing the magnitude. The overall Army budget stands at $252.8 billion, including $37.7 billion in reconciliation funding — just over 10 percent above FY2026 appropriated funding, per Janes' reading of the Army proposal.
The largest growth is in foundational technology development. The Army requested $156 million for the Electronic Warfare Advanced Technology (EWAT) program in FY2027, an 81 percent increase from the $86 million provided in FY2026 — an increase of $70 million. EWAT funds the development and demonstration of technologies that have not yet been approved as programs of record.
The TLS Manpack — a dismounted electronic attack system soldiers can use for direction finding and limited jamming on the move — received $47.9 million in RDT&E and $76.1 million in procurement, with plans to field 159 systems to up to 24 Army units in FY2027. Vehicle-mounted kit prototypes for the Manpack are being tested with Transformation in Contact 2.0 units, with a production variant planned for FY2028.
The REWSI production IDIQs — awarded Aug. 27 and Sept. 3, 2026, and announced by the Army in September — went to Heaviside Industries (ceiling up to $99 million) and Research Innovations (ceiling up to $99.5 million per war.gov; the Army announcement reported $96.9 million per Inside Defense). The April 2026 REWSI solutions call, released through the Vulcan contracting portal, gave industry an open problem statement and selected commercial capabilities against it. Those two IDIQs, with estimated completion through 2031, accelerate formation-level EW deployment without waiting for a formal program of record.
The budget also supports IEW battalion transformation — accelerating fielding to two IEW battalions equipped with advanced EW systems — and closer alignment between EW companies and their parent IEW battalions.
What the Budget Deemphasizes
The same FY2027 request cut the Sensor to Shooter Advanced Technology program to $11 million, a 56 percent reduction from $25 million in FY2026. ExecutiveGov presents that line inside the EWAT budget item, with the Army's stated rationale being to free "more money for other EW priorities." The Sensor to Shooter line matures a network lethality architecture to enable JADC2 decision-aid algorithms — coordinated and synchronized effects across the kill chain, shortening the sensor-to-shooter timeline in large-scale combat operations.
In our reading, cutting that S&T line while dramatically increasing foundational EW development is a sequencing choice. In our reading, the FY2027 EW budget reflects a prioritization of getting capable hardware and trained formations into the field first, with the automated decision-aid integration layer to follow as the technology matures. Army Portfolio Acquisition Executive for C2/Counter C2 Joseph Welch stated in Army budget materials reported by Breaking Defense: "The pace of technology evolution is faster than the pace of traditional procurement processes, and this is particularly evident within the EMSO environment. We have reformed these processes and are now prioritizing investments in capabilities that will allow us to achieve spectrum dominance."
Breaking Defense reporting from April 2026 notes the Army sees no new EW program starts in FY27, is consolidating budget lines that began in FY26 to allow rapid prototyping, and is explicitly moving away from systems designed against rigid specifications toward commercially available capability that can be fielded rapidly. The EMSO CON calls for future systems to have an open architecture compatible with the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) framework — meaning JADC2 integration is a designed-in characteristic for new systems, not a current-cycle deployment milestone.
In our assessment, the Sensor to Shooter cut is a deferral rather than a cancellation, though the outyear program objective memorandum was not read in preparing this article, and program offices should check the FY2028–2029 request before treating that assessment as confirmed.
The Integration Problem This Creates — and Where It Is Narrowing
The gap between EW hardware and automated JADC2 integration is not unique to EW, and it is narrowing faster in some areas than the budget alone would suggest.
Then-Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2026 that Army software systems are "compartmentalized, isolated, and ineffective against modern threats," and pointed to Operation Jailbreak as a remedy — the first Right to Integrate hackathon, held at Fort Carson in May–June 2026, in which more than 50 companies opened interfaces across more than 70 systems. Further Right to Integrate iterations are continuing.
The EWC2 (Electromagnetic Warfare Command and Control) system — a web application aligned with NGC2 — is the Army's connective layer between EW platforms and the broader C2 picture. A CPE ISW profile of Capt. Curtis Hart, Assistant Product Manager at PdM Electronic Warfare Integration, notes that his team is simultaneously supporting the legacy Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) while driving EWC2 development forward. Significantly, Hart's team has already integrated EWC2 with the 4th Infantry Division's NGC2 architecture, enabling the division to conduct electromagnetic warfare operations in a fully modernized environment during the Ivy Sting exercise series. NGC2 has since entered its deployment phase, expanding from 4ID and 25th Infantry Division to I Corps, with about $100 million in application awards to nine companies (AFCEA, Oct 2026; Breaking Defense, Oct 7, 2026).
The practical implication for program offices requires distinguishing two things. Division-level EW command and control integration has been demonstrated: EWC2 was integrated with 4ID's NGC2 architecture during Ivy Sting, and the EWC2 team supports NGC2 experimentation at 4ID and 25ID. NGC2 itself is now expanding to I Corps. What is not yet fully funded is the automated, joint, network-speed decision-aid layer — the coordinated cross-command kill-chain integration that the Sensor to Shooter line was building toward. A program office assuming full JADC2 decision-aid integration in a 2027 or 2028 architecture should track where that layer actually stands. A program office planning for formation-level EW effects, coordinated through EWC2 and NGC2, is working with what the Army is actively fielding.
What Should Change a Program Office's Decision
Several conditions are worth tracking:
- I Corps–scale NGC2/EWC2 deployment with verified data flow. Division-level EW C2 integration has been demonstrated (4ID, Ivy Sting). The near-term question is whether NGC2 scales to I Corps with EWC2 data flow sufficient for a program's specific mission requirements — and whether that timeline aligns with the program's architecture milestones.
- A restored Sensor to Shooter line in the FY2028 or FY2029 request. The 56 percent cut is, in our assessment, a deferral. If the out-year POM restores funding, it signals the Army expects EWAT investments to mature enough in FY27–28 to support automated decision-aid development. That signal — not today's cut — is the meaningful threshold for programs planning against an automated kill chain.
- REWSI fielding results. The Heaviside and Research Innovations IDIQs run through 2031. Early results from formation-level REWSI employment, particularly interoperability data with other JADC2 nodes through EWC2/NGC2 interfaces, would either confirm the technology-first sequencing or reveal gaps that force a re-prioritization.
- The Army's electromagnetic dominance deadline assessment. In our view, if the Army concludes in late 2027 that the EMSO CON deployment has achieved baseline formation capability, it will likely pivot investment toward automated integration. That assessment — not a calendar date — is the meaningful threshold, though the Army has not publicly stated what criteria it will use to make it.
A program office can also design EW as a local formation effect that contributes to the sensor-to-shooter timeline through EWC2 and NGC2 at division level, while planning for automated joint integration as a future increment when the supporting architecture matures. This is what the current fielding model actually supports. It is operationally meaningful and achievable on the Army's near-term schedule; it does not close the network-speed kill chain that full JADC2 integration is intended to enable.
Sources and further reading
- Hegseth Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform Memo (Apr 30, 2025)
- Army FY2027 Budget Highlights
- Army Requests Funds to Speed Development, Production of EW Systems — Breaking Defense, Apr 30, 2026
- Army Issues Broad Appeal to Industry for Electromagnetic Spectrum Solutions — Breaking Defense, Feb 25, 2026
- All About the Army's Big Funding Boost for Advanced Electronic Warfare — ExecutiveGov, Jun 17, 2026
- Pentagon Budget 2027: US Army to Accelerate SIGINT, EW Systems Fielding — Janes
- Army Awards Nearly $200M Under Recent EW Solutions Call — Inside Defense, Sep 11, 2026
- US Army Revamping Its Electronic Warfare Acquisition System — Defense News, Feb 25, 2026
- Spearheading the Spectrum: How Capt. Curtis Hart Is Driving Acquisition Reform and Electromagnetic Dominance — CPE ISW, Jun 10, 2026
- Army Advances Historic First Right to Integrate Hackathon — Army.mil
- Army Scaling Next-Generation C2, Project Progresses to Deployment Phase — AFCEA Signal, Oct 2026
- Army Issues Just Under $100M in Application Awards for NGC2 to 9 Companies — Breaking Defense, Oct 7, 2026
- Ukraine's Battlefield Integration Surpasses US Military's, Army Secretary Says — Military Times, May 13, 2026
Spartan X's work in AI-enabled command and control includes the architecture analysis required to distinguish where an emerging capability — like EW — can connect into an available fielded C2 layer like EWC2/NGC2 versus where it still depends on automated decision-aid integration that the budget has not yet fully funded. That question determines whether a program office can treat EW as an available node in its architecture today or needs to design a local formation-effect path as an interim measure. The gap between what is fielded at division level and what will be automated at joint command level is exactly where architecture decisions go wrong before milestone review.



